Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology

Master of Science in Cybersecurity – Prof. Luigi V. Mancini

CYBERSURE
CYBERsecurity at Sapienza University of Rome Events

Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology

Andrea Monti – Lawyer

 Affiliation: Adjunct Professor of Public Policy and Public Security Law at the University of Chieti-Pescara.

 May 13, 2019, from 16:15 to 18:30

 Aula II, ground floor of the building “ex-Facoltà di Scienze Statistiche” in “Città Universitaria”, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5 (Rome).

 

Part 1. Technological public order and information security

Part 2. Public security and information technology

 

The pervasiveness of information technologies has repercussions not solely in terms of judicial activity, but also affects the management of public order – and therefore the exercise of powers attributed to the Ministry of the Interior in different areas and before the Judiciary intervention.

A modern notion of public order must necessarily take into account the issue of information security as its own constitutive element.

This seminar describes, starting from the analysis of the Consolidated Law on public security, the structure of the public security authority, and defines roles and powers and analyses the way in which this structure deals with the subjects of the information society.              

In particular, it highlights the possible interactions between the State Police, Internet providers and platform operators Over the top.

Participation is free, however registration is required on Eventbrite by searching “Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology”.

Upcoming Seminars at https://cybersecurity.uniroma1.it/cybersecurity-seminars

For any questions or further info, please visit https://cybersecurity.uniroma1.it or write to cybersecurity_info@uniroma1.it

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The CIA to provide evidence of HwaWei involvement with Chinese Military and Intelligence

Even if true, where is the beef? That HwaWei got funded by Chinese military and intelligence is not an issue. Do we already forgot the “Fritz Chip”, the use of (Western-sponsored) State malware in intelligence and criminal investigation and so on?

From a national security and public policy perspective, it is  logic that a sovereign state explores all the possibilities to obtain superiority over its foes and “friend” too. Thus – if confirmed – the proof offered by CIA of HwaWei involvement with the national security apparatus shouldn’t surprise. Continue reading “The CIA to provide evidence of HwaWei involvement with Chinese Military and Intelligence”

What Boxe and Knife Sparring teach about ICT Security

Time and Space are two key factors in any strategy, whether offensive or defensive.  This is true regardless you are involved in large scale, symmetric conflict, in an ambush or in a direct attack. There are, though, serious differences among the possible reactive approaches according to the different factual circumstances.

An empty hand attack can be handled by taking into account to be hit as a way to “close the distance” and gain a tactical advantage. This is best exemplified by the way boxeurs manage the opponent: maybe they get partially hit by a jab, but in the meantime they set themselves in the right position and time to hit with a devastating cross.

Knife sparring – let alone actual “fighting” or self-defense – requires an entirely different approach. In such kind of training it is mandatory not to be hit because a hit actually means a “cut”. Therefore the training is focused on being as far as possible from the blade, and hitting the opponent’s hand with the defendant’s knife (this is called “defang the snake”.) In knife sparring everything is faster and the reaction’s options are very limited, as you don’t backstep and then hit back, or try to catch&parry a knife flying around your face or guts, as you would with just a bare fist.

This key difference matches a common underrated assessment when designing an ICT security model: is the infrastructure able to sustain a hit and remains operational while the “defense team” is summoned (as in the Boxing Sparring)? Or the infrastructure is not designed to act like that and, once hit, its operational capability is progressively hampered (as in the Knife Sparring)?

The answer to this questions is important because it helps the security manager to better define the structure, the roles and the budget of the incident management team.

An Australian Bill makes mandatory for IT companies to crack users’ encrypted messages

The Australian Parliament recently passed the  Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 that might have a disruptive effect on the whole IT business, by forcing companies into designing unsecure hardware and software and weakening users’ confidence. Continue reading “An Australian Bill makes mandatory for IT companies to crack users’ encrypted messages”

A contribution to the analysis of the legal status of cryptocurrencies

Summary
This paper advocates that cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum don’t challenge the current legal system, since they fit comfortably enough into the immaterial asset legal definition. As such, while a blockchain-based cryptocurrency can’t be considered as legal tender or electronic money, it can be exchanged on a contractual basis as it happens with every other kind of good. Continue reading “A contribution to the analysis of the legal status of cryptocurrencies”