This video shows the different penetrating power of various pistol caliber and gives a useful tip for those who (claim to) work in the IT security field: when setting up a perimeter defense, the “penetrating power” of the attack should be taken into account.
In other words, there is no “one-fit-all” solution when it comes to building a digital bulletproof vest, and if somebody thinks that a fancy leather jacket might be the very same than a kevlar vest with ceramic plates, he might be wrong. Deadly, as it would be the infrastructure he claimed to protect.
a framework which allows the EU to impose targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks which constitute an external threatto the EU or its member states, including cyber-attacks against third States or international organisations where restricted measures are considered necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
In other words, this framework allows the EU to enforce a series of sanctions – including the prohibition of entry into the EU – to those who attack the computer resources located in the Union from other countries. At first glance, everything would look normal and – all in all – acceptable. But since the devil is in the details, a more in-depth look at the matter reveals a few problems.
Firstly, the violation of the principles of due process: a computer attack is a crime and for sanctions to be applied to the culprits, a proper trial is necessary. In the outline envisaged by the Council of European Union, this is not foreseen. A blatant violation of the fundamental rights of the individual (also) recognized by the Nice Charter.
Secondly, even if the first condition is met, it must be remembered that in criminal matters the jurisdiction belongs strictly and solely to the national legislator. What cases and which penal codes or similar rules will be applied in order to decide whether we are dealing with an event which falls within the scope of the ‘framework’ laid down by the Council?
Thirdly, are we talking about public policy, state security or the defense of the interests of the Union? The question is not trivial because in the first case the “domain” is that of a hypothetical “EU Ministry of the Interior”, in the second of the hypothetical “European secret services” and in the third case of the “Ministry of Defense”. Ambiguously, however, the Council speaks of “discouraging” (i.e. “preventing”) and “opposing” (i.e. “reacting”) in order to achieve the objectives of the foreign policy “And” those of the common security. This means that “prevention” and “reaction” to the cyber attacks are instruments of “enforcement” of the foreign policy of the EU also independently of security issues.
Master of Science in Cybersecurity – Prof. Luigi V. Mancini
CYBERSURE CYBERsecurity at Sapienza University of Rome Events
Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology
Andrea Monti – Lawyer
?Affiliation: Adjunct Professor of Public Policy and Public Security Law at the University of Chieti-Pescara.
?May 13, 2019, from 16:15 to 18:30
?Aula II, ground floor of the building “ex-Facoltà di Scienze Statistiche” in “Città Universitaria”, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5 (Rome).
Part 1. Technological public order and information security
Part 2. Public security and information technology
The pervasiveness of information technologies has repercussions not solely in terms of judicial activity, but also affects the management of public order – and therefore the exercise of powers attributed to the Ministry of the Interior in different areas and before the Judiciary intervention.
A modern notion of public order must necessarily take into account the issue of information security as its own constitutive element.
This seminar describes, starting from the analysis of the Consolidated Law on public security, the structure of the public security authority, and defines roles and powers and analyses the way in which this structure deals with the subjects of the information society. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
In particular, it highlights the possible interactions between the State Police, Internet providers and platform operators Over the top.
Even if true, where is the beef? That HwaWei got funded by Chinese military and intelligence is not an issue. Do we already forgot the “Fritz Chip”, the use of (Western-sponsored) State malware in intelligence and criminal investigation and so on?