A comparison between the White House document ‘Winning the Race’ and the ‘Action Plan for Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence’ recently released by Beijing highlights that in the competition for global leadership in AI, the two superpowers are adopting fundamentally different philosophies and operating methodologies, but with the same goal: the creation of spheres of technological influence. by Andrea Monti – Adjunct Professor of Digital Identity, Privacy and Cybersecurity at Sapienza – Rome University
Summarising the content of the two documents as succinctly as possible, it can be said that the United States is pursuing an explicit strategy of technological dominance in AI through a programme that puts the market first, exploiting its private sector and promoting open source innovation within the framework of “American values”. This means structurally embedding Big Tech within the strategy, entrusting it with the task of “colonising” the infrastructure of other countries by preventing — or at least slowing down — the development of competing technologies, including European ones.
China, on the other hand, is promoting a strategy of attacking global markets through the availability of low-cost AI technologies capable of competing with those of the West. Thus, thanks to a deep-rooted familiarity with Neo-Confucian principles, the “openness” and “cooperation” underlying Beijing’s strategic document translate into a form of technological colonialism not unlike that of the US, aimed at establishing hierarchical influence over emerging economies and, potentially, over those Western countries that are not fully aligned with the Atlantic bloc.
The US: internal strengthening and reduction of the autonomy of states within its sphere of influence
The US strategy is extremely clear and makes no secret of its desire to achieve dominance over AI and its use by any means necessary, including — as demonstrated by the tariff negotiations — the use of force even against like-minded countries.
Therefore, on the one hand, on the domestic front, a process of debureaucratisation and deregulation will be launched across the entire AI supply chain, from the creation of infrastructure to the reuse of data (which will inevitably open up another front in the clash with the EU, which has long been seeking to impose limits on Big Tech’s access to the data of EU citizens). At the same time, and without hypocrisy, the strategy explicitly provides for the development of military applications of artificial intelligence extended to biosecurity (which could also be translated as defence against pathogens and therefore “biological warfare”).
The external front, as already mentioned, is primarily entrusted to the oversight of Big Tech and AI companies, which represent the spearhead whose task is to commercially “occupy” foreign infrastructure, thus making investments in national technologies uneconomical, according to a dynamic that is not unfamiliar in technological relations between EU countries. The second line of action concerns control over access to knowledge for the development of AI technologies. This may mean making sub-optimal technologies available to foreign partners, expanding export bans on dual-use technologies and restricting access to the US scientific community.
China: hierarchical cooperation and “open” technological colonialism
The Chinese strategy presents a nuanced approach which, while emphasising cooperation and openness to the outside world, implicitly serves a long-term geopolitical goal: to establish technological leadership through a value system that differs from that of the West and is based on the controversial category of “Asian Values”.
China’s approach to AI governance is deeply rooted in a philosophy of rule-by-law in which legal norms are shaped and adapted to align with the political needs and values defined by the Chinese Communist Party, rather than serving as an insurmountable limit on state power (rule-of-law). This vision is based on a “secular” idea of law, free from moral constraints and functional to the exercise of power, based on the prevalence of the public function of norms over the interests of the individual. This framework incorporates, as mentioned, neo-Confucian principles, according to which harmony and social order are achieved through moral respect for the values defined by the state, thus reducing dependence on “mere” legislation. The promotion of the concepts of harmony and order therefore seems aimed at building a unifying cultural and geopolitical reference system in the Far East, implicitly positioning Beijing as the arbiter of these values and favouring a hierarchical form of cooperation with (at least some of) the Sinicised Asian countries.
While the United States sees open source as a tool for independent innovation, China “weaponises” open source as a geopolitical lever. The “Action Plan” calls for adherence to the spirit of openness and sharing, the building of international cooperation platforms, and the promotion of “free” communities and platforms. But this “open sharing of basic resources” (e.g., technical documents, interface documents) and the strengthening of the “open source ecosystem” aim to, or at least have the effect of, lowering the threshold for access to technological innovation for other countries, particularly in the Global South.
Such a strategy allows China to provide alternatives to Western technologies, fostering de facto dependence on its own ecosystem instead of direct control by the West. Huawei’s development of HarmonyOS Next and its open source version, OpenHarmony, is an example of this, as it offers an alternative ecosystem to Android and potentially increases China’s bargaining power with countries that previously depended on Western infrastructure. This approach may become particularly attractive to countries that are unable to develop high-tech solutions on their own, effectively creating a form of “technological colonialism” in which other nations build their own dependence on Chinese infrastructure, components and standards.
Finally, in line with data protection and national security regulations, China’s strategy places significant emphasis on data sovereignty.
Similarities, differences and strategic implications
A comparative analysis of the two documents reveals a critical commonality of objectives, alongside differences that are equally critical in terms of their impact on international relations.
Firstly, both superpowers base their strategies on the affirmation of their values, technological colonialism and control over data. This translates into the construction of spheres of influence within which they can exert, directly or indirectly, a conditioning role over the sovereignty of the countries that are part of them.
It can be argued that the United States defends individual freedoms and market-driven innovation, while China, on the contrary, prioritises collective harmony and state stability, but in geopolitical terms, the substance of the facts remains the same. Although both claim to want to “open up” AI technologies through unhindered innovation and market access for their products (the US) or the provision of affordable alternatives (China), the end result is the same: to cultivate influence and create technological dependencies on which to build a new world order.
Such a picture is obviously not black and white. Both countries must contend with the inevitable tensions between security (which leads to closure) and the market (which requires openness) in the case of the US, and with the need to respond in a measured way to Western actions in addition to creating their own sphere of influence in the case of China.
Above all, General von Moltke’s warning weighs heavily: no plan survives contact with battle.
The absent role of the European Union and other international players
In the no-holds-barred race to occupy the top spot in this new world order, the big absentee is the European Union, paralysed by cumbersome and bureaucratic regulations and Hegelianly convinced that it can bend international reality to its own decisions. Neither Washington DC nor Beijing consider Brussels a strategic interlocutor, given that its policies have no external influence and generate inertia on the domestic front. It is no coincidence, in fact, that while European research continues to make important strides in the theoretical advancement of AI, the ability to compete effectively on foreign markets and the industrial and operational benefits for citizens, businesses and institutions are still a long way off.
As for other international players, limiting ourselves to Japan and India, which for different reasons play an important role in relations with the EU, the former has just translated its policy for the development of AI infrastructure into law, adopting a choice that favours the medium to long term and an approach based on giving the executive the power to make strategic choices, while India has just released its strategic document on the subject, which reveals New Delhi’s desire to focus on the use of AI domestically and aim — as is already the case in other sectors — to transform India into an “AI Garage”, an artificial intelligence factory to be made available to emerging countries.
However ambitious and potentially capable of reshaping the geopolitics of AI, these programmes are still in their infancy and therefore cannot have a direct impact on what is currently still a two-horse race in which, it should be remembered, there are no independent referees to decide who comes second.