Prevention and Repression of Computer Crime against the EU: the problem is clear, the solution doesn’t

On May 17, 2019 the Council of the European Union has established

a framework which allows the EU to impose targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks which constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states, including cyber-attacks against third States or international organisations where restricted measures are considered necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In other words, this framework allows the EU to enforce a series of sanctions – including the prohibition of entry into the EU – to  those who attack the computer resources located in the Union from other countries. At first glance, everything would look normal and – all in all – acceptable. But since the devil is in the details, a more in-depth look at the matter reveals a few problems.

Firstly, the violation of the principles of due process: a computer attack is a crime and for sanctions to be applied to the culprits,  a proper trial is necessary. In the outline envisaged by the Council of European Union, this is not foreseen.  A blatant violation of the fundamental rights of the individual (also) recognized by the Nice Charter.

Secondly, even if the first condition is met, it must be remembered that in criminal matters the jurisdiction belongs strictly and solely to the national legislator. What cases and which penal codes or similar rules will be applied in order to decide whether we are dealing with an event which falls within the scope of the ‘framework’ laid down by the Council?

Thirdly, are we talking about public policy, state security or the defense of the interests of the Union? The question is not trivial because in the first case the “domain” is that of a hypothetical “EU Ministry of the Interior”, in the second of the hypothetical “European secret services” and in the third case of the “Ministry of Defense”. Ambiguously, however, the Council speaks of “discouraging” (i.e. “preventing”) and “opposing” (i.e. “reacting”) in order to achieve the objectives of the foreign policy “And” those of the common security. This means that “prevention” and “reaction” to the cyber attacks are instruments of “enforcement” of the foreign policy of the EU also independently of security issues.

Let’s get ready to face very interesting issues…

Apple, Facial Recognition and the Right of Defense (plus, a sting at the GDPR)

The news is gaining momentum: Osumane Bah, a student that has been charged of multiple ? theft in ? Apple stores located in several cities of the United States, filed a suit against the Cupertino-based company seeking for a compensation of one billion USD for having been wrongly identified by Apple as the author of these crimes. The decisive evidence that lead to his involvement in the investigations, this is Mr. Bah’s basis of the claim, is that he has been ? wrongly identified by a facial recognition system operated either by Apple or a security company hired for the job. Continue reading “Apple, Facial Recognition and the Right of Defense (plus, a sting at the GDPR)”

Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology

Master of Science in Cybersecurity – Prof. Luigi V. Mancini

CYBERSURE
CYBERsecurity at Sapienza University of Rome Events

Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology

Andrea Monti – Lawyer

 ?Affiliation: Adjunct Professor of Public Policy and Public Security Law at the University of Chieti-Pescara.

 ?May 13, 2019, from 16:15 to 18:30

 ?Aula II, ground floor of the building “ex-Facoltà di Scienze Statistiche” in “Città Universitaria”, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5 (Rome).

 ?

Part 1. Technological public order and information security

Part 2. Public security and information technology

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The pervasiveness of information technologies has repercussions not solely in terms of judicial activity, but also affects the management of public order – and therefore the exercise of powers attributed to the Ministry of the Interior in different areas and before the Judiciary intervention.

A modern notion of public order must necessarily take into account the issue of information security as its own constitutive element.

This seminar describes, starting from the analysis of the Consolidated Law on public security, the structure of the public security authority, and defines roles and powers and analyses the way in which this structure deals with the subjects of the information society. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

In particular, it highlights the possible interactions between the State Police, Internet providers and platform operators Over the top.

Participation is free, however registration is required on Eventbrite by searching “Public security, powers of the public security authority and information technology”.

Upcoming Seminars at https://cybersecurity.uniroma1.it/cybersecurity-seminars

For any questions or further info, please visit https://cybersecurity.uniroma1.it or write to cybersecurity_info@uniroma1.it

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An Australian Bill makes mandatory for IT companies to crack users’ encrypted messages

The Australian Parliament recently passed the ? Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 that might have a disruptive effect on the whole IT business, by forcing companies into designing unsecure hardware and software and weakening users’ confidence. Continue reading “An Australian Bill makes mandatory for IT companies to crack users’ encrypted messages”

A contribution to the analysis of the legal status of cryptocurrencies

Summary
This paper advocates that cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum don’t challenge the current legal system, since they fit comfortably enough into the immaterial asset legal definition. As such, while a blockchain-based cryptocurrency can’t be considered as legal tender or electronic money, it can be exchanged on a contractual basis as it happens with every other kind of good. Continue reading “A contribution to the analysis of the legal status of cryptocurrencies”