The control over software is the leverage of the US strategy of expansion in the Far East. This strategy includes the sale, in anti-Chinese function, of armaments to countries in the Indo-Pacific area qualified as “like-minded partners” or “allies” also in the absence of formalisation in treaties such as, for example, that of NATO by Andrea Monti

The software has become a central element of national security protection (or vulnerability) because the functioning of the equipment and systems that make a country’s network work depends on it. Its robustness, however, besides being the first line of defence in technical terms, is also a very efficient geopolitical control tool. Continue reading “The role of software and technological dependence in US geopolitical strategies in the Far East and beyond”

TIM may use 5G equipment produced by Huawei, provided that it follows the rules dictated by the Presidency of the Council. Is national security safe? by Andrea Monti – originally published in Italian by Infosec.News

Background

On 7 August 2020, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a decree setting out the conditions under which Huawei can provide Italy, through former network monopolist TIM S.p.a., with its 5G infrastructure.

Apart from constitutional issues (yet another ‘creative’ use of the Prime Minister’s Decree, after the management of the COVID-19 lockdown) and political aspects (the decree would neither be a ‘surrender’ to China nor, therefore, a ‘betrayal’ of the Atlantic allies), the Conte-Huawei Decree raises several legal and technical doubts about its real effectiveness. Continue reading “Critical Issues of the Conte-Huawei decree”