China is promoting the creation of an international organisation for the resolution of disputes between states that operates in parallel with (not entirely) equivalent Western structures, shifting the venue for conflict resolution to the East by Andrea Monti – adjunct professor of cybersecurity, privacy and digital identity at the University of Rome-Sapienza – Initially published in Italian by Formiche.net
On 30 May 2025 in Hong Kong, 85 countries and some 20 international organisations attended the ceremony for the signing by 33 states of the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organisation for Mediation.
What is IOMED and how does it fit into the framework of a-national “judicial” organisations?
On paper, IOMED presents itself as “the first intergovernmental organisation dedicated to dispute resolution through mediation”, inspired by the principle set out in Article 33 of the UN Charter.
The idea itself is not new, as there are numerous organisations that provide “private” systems for mediating disputes that arise between states. Some examples are the “dispute settlement” system of the WTO, or the “alternative dispute resolution” system of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. However, IOMED has some very distinctive geopolitical characteristics that clearly distinguish it from structures that are essentially similar in appearance.
IOMED can operate on several fronts simultaneously
A fundamental difference is that, unlike other mediation bodies such as those mentioned above, IOMED potentially operates — but more on this later — on almost any type of dispute between states, and between non-state actors and sovereign political entities. In other words, IOMED is essentially a diplomatic management tool — so much so that its members enjoy a kind of diplomatic immunity — not based on the concept of a “court” or “tribunal”.
IOMED is not an international court
This brings us to the second distinctive feature of this organisation: the rejection of the “judicial” dimension in favour of mediation. Unlike other structures such as the International Criminal Court, IOMED does not “judge” or “apply the law” but recognises — as stated in the preamble to the Convention — “the need for flexibility in the settlement of international disputes, the significant advantages of mediation and its increasing use in practice”. In purely legal terms, IOMED’s approach seems, ideally, to be a contemporary reworking of the cultural dispute between the models of social regulation designed by Confucius and the Legalists, which contrasted, albeit not radically, the soft power based on ethics and rituals with the hard power of law and sanctions. Obviously, there is no deterministic continuity in all this, and the Chinese legal system also takes into account the influences of other traditions. However, the concrete impacts of this approach to rights management cannot be underestimated.
The geopolitical role of harmony in mediation between states
The concept of mediation as a tool that, as stated in the preamble to the Convention, “contributes to building harmonious international relations” is, in fact, very Confucian and is a constant presence, particularly in Beijing’s (geo)political communication — from the political statements of its leaders to the marketing strategies of Chinese Big Tech. However, the meaning of the concept of harmony is not necessarily synonymous with peace and equality, so much so that its concrete application has not prevented and does not prevent the use of force or the use of less direct but no less aggressive approaches to achieve political objectives.
Therefore, the emphasis on “flexibility” guaranteed by a system of mediation between states means, in concrete terms, that in the name of pragmatism and procedural confidentiality, the limits imposed by international law do not necessarily have to be respected, if the parties agree. Above all, it means that China assumes a substantial role as a “trusted facilitator” for countries that may not willingly accept the jurisdiction of bodies in which they are inadequately represented.
The role of selective multilateralism
Direct access to IOMED mediation is available to States that have ratified the Convention, but even those that have not done so may request that the organisation activate the dispute settlement system.
However, there are matters that are or may be excluded from IOMED’s jurisdiction. Article 25.3 of the Convention establishes a kind of “selective multilateralism” that allows states to exclude disputes relating to territorial sovereignty and the delimitation of territorial waters. Thanks to this clause, for example, China can prevent IOMED from being invoked in relation to claims in the South China Sea, those over Taiwan and border disputes with neighbouring countries such as India.
Strategic Assessment
From a Western perspective, IOMED appears to be an important component of China’s global strategy to acquire an increasingly autonomous and equal role on the international stage.
On the one hand, it allows for strategic ambiguity and avoids the internationalisation of certain disputes. On the other hand, it weakens the perception of the importance of binding decisions by a “superior” third party and replaces it with that of “negotiation between equals”. Consequently, by avoiding binding decisions, it does not affect national sovereignty. Furthermore, IOMED incorporates the legal principles of the Chinese legal system into the global architecture of dispute resolution and represents an alternative forum to traditional Western ones, where China considers itself to be at a disadvantage or in any case less favourable.
In conclusion, therefore, IOMED represents an additional tool for managing international relations to create new centres of gravity around which to build alliances outside traditional spheres of influence. In other words, we are witnessing a sophisticated exercise in “lawfare” — the strategic use of law for geopolitical purposes — whose objective is clearly to create an alternative infrastructure for global governance.
A warning to Western institutions
It is not possible to know at this stage whether this project will achieve its objectives, but in the short term, IOMED certainly forces the West to rethink the functioning of its a-national organisations. Such reflection is essential to prevent institutions from losing credibility in the eyes of those countries that we insist on calling “emerging” but which have long been an established reality on the international stage and could therefore find in IOMED a more efficient and functional tool. In short, perhaps we should ask ourselves whether it is not Western institutions that need to be reformed, not only to counter China’s growing influence, but also to adapt to a new multipolarity that no longer sees Washington and — albeit to a much lesser extent — Brussels as the only centres.