To prevent fraud relating to the retaking of the national entrance exam for medical degree programmes, the Indian government has suspended access to the platform even for users who are completely unconnected to the incident. This case illustrates the shift from cracking down on specific types of behaviour to the preventative and blanket restriction of communications: an approach that also sheds light on the controversial European initiatives on content moderation and the new British protocols for managing online crises by Andrea Monti – Initially published in Italian by Italian Tech – La Repubblica
A blanket ban to combat specific types of fraud
The Indian authorities have ordered the blocking of Telegram until 22 June 2026 and the suspension, until 30 June, of the ability to edit messages that have already been posted whilst retaining the original timestamp.
This is to prevent fraud against students who will have to sit the NEET (National Eligibility Entrance Test – Undergraduate) – the national entrance exam for medical degree programmes – again, following the cancellation of the previous sitting.
The decision has provoked the predictable (and self-serving) reactions from Pavel Durov, CEO of Telegram, who has complained that the rights of innocent users are being infringed and that the measure is pointless. Meanwhile, NGOs active in the field of civil rights have denounced it as an attack on freedom of expression.
This is not the first time governments have taken such measures: last December 2025, Russia blocked FaceTime and Snapchat, whilst China demanded the removal of WhatsApp, Threads, Telegram and Signal from the App Store; and if we shift our focus from messaging to social media, how can we fail to mention that Meta reported having been subjected, during the COVID-19 pandemic, to pressure from the US administration to censor certain content, and that the Digital Services Act adopted by the EU essentially legalises the privatisation of censorship?
From national security to public order
From this perspective, therefore, the Indian initiative should not cause quite such a stir. However, what sets this block apart is the justification, as stated by the Indian National Testing Agency: the protection of public order.
When, as has happened in the recent past, various types of blocks are imposed in the name of ‘national security’, it is clear that this was done within the context of geopolitical disputes and that the formal justifications put forward by governments served as little more than the traditional fig leaf. If, on the other hand, public order is invoked, the situation is very different because this constitutesan encroachment on citizens’ freedoms, as for some time they will not even be able to edit the messages they have exchanged to facilitate any police investigations.
The collective cost of prevention
To put it bluntly, we are faced with the socialisation of the cost of prevention, and this is precisely the new development that characterises the Indian case: if the platforms do not ‘cooperate’ and the measures adopted so far prove insufficient, then there is no room for subtlety: everyone is affected, regardless of whether or not they have played any part in the matter.
Strictly speaking, this is not a collective penalty in the legal sense, but in practice the Indian decision reproduces its material effects, namely the widespread curtailment of the rights of people unconnected to any unlawful activity.
A bit like what the European Commission is doing with the ‘CSAM Regulation’ – the one seeking to impose client-side scanning (the automated, preventive and permanent scanning of a smart device for illegal content before it is sent), which even Apple had initially proposed to implement in relation to content intended for iCloud Photos, and which turns every user into a perpetual suspect.
From temporary blocking to systematic monitoring
The issue, therefore, is that whilst the Indian measure – however questionable – is at least temporary, if the European CSAM Regulation were to be approved in its proposed form, a boundary would be set that cannot be torn down but can be shifted at will. First, these invasive measures will apply only to minors; then to terrorism; then to copyright; then to defamation; and so on, right down to simple ‘non-conformist’ opinions.
Censorship enters crisis protocols
It is not difficult to imagine that what has already happened and is currently happening to online communication will also happen with client-side scanning, and not only within the European Union. On 9 June 2026, in fact, the UK communications regulator published the text of a plan for the adoption of measures to search for and block illegal content and, of course, content harmful to minors, which operators must implement in the event of an emergency – once again, for reasons of public order. For the time being, no new obligations have yet been imposed — and this is the crucial point — but ‘merely’ recommendations to step up keyword searches and other methods to make moderation more efficient; that is, to call a spade a spade, censorship.
Who controls the boundary?
To be intellectually honest, one must admit that in certain cases, exceptional or invasive measures are the only viable option in the immediate term. However, this does not justify hasty and opaque solutions, adopted in the name of vague ‘alerts’ and without any real opportunity to understand the reasons behind certain choices.
The battle between security and rights, therefore, is fought on the field of transparency regarding the reasons underpinning security decisions, because if the pitch is poorly lit, the temptation to handle the ball – or worse – becomes too great.