Prime Minister Takaichi recently announced his intention to bring the national intelligence service under his control, which will be modelled on the US CIA. Is this another step towards overcoming the constitutional ban on operating outside Japan’s borders? By Andrea Monti – professor of digital identity, privacy and cybersecurity at the University of Rome-Sapienza – Initially published in Italian by Formiche.net
The role of the Japanese Constitution in protecting national security
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, adopted under US supervision after the end of the Second World War, is the legal instrument that was supposed to represent an insurmountable barrier to any political attempt to reorganise a military force capable of operating offensively. Given that the new Japanese legal system was (and is) strongly inspired by its Western counterparts, the presence of a constitutional constraint prevented (and prevents) the enactment of laws that were (are) in conflict with the prohibition on developing offensive capabilities.
The pragmatic overcoming of the regulatory limit
This, however, did not prevent Japan from acquiring, over the years, a national defence force equipped in a manner that is essentially indistinguishable from that of an army proper, gradually changing its nature from purely reactive to potentially offensive, with the only substantial limitation being the absence of a nuclear deterrent.
A paradigmatic example is the transformation of the JS Kaga, to be completed by 2027. From a destroyer, the Kaga is being converted into a multi-role cruiser for air support — in other words, an aircraft carrier, but one that does not reach the tonnage necessary to make the “class jump”, formally maintaining the “defensive” nature of its use.
Similarly, first the national security strategy approved in December 2022 and then the Cyber counter-capacity enhancement law approved in 2025 resort to subtle terminological distinctions to maintain formal consistency with Article 9 of the Constitution, but in fact expand the scope of security structures.
Thus, the regulations refer to “preventive defence” rather than surprise attacks, or “cybersecurity measures” rather than reactive actions (similar, moreover, to those permitted by the Italian law on cyber retaliation of 2022) in the face of attacks on technological infrastructure. They are therefore a paradigmatic example of the intense interpretative work that has been going on incessantly for a long time to circumvent the legal obstacle to the restoration of full offensive capability, in accordance with constitutional forms.
Intelligence reform
The intelligence restructuring project announced by Prime Minister Takaichi is part of this long-term trend and aims to bring under the control of the head of government a function that is critical not only for national security but also for the military, whether offensive or defensive.
At present, the management of Japanese intelligence — the 公安調査庁 (kōanchōsa-chō, Public Security Intelligence Agency) — is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. However, this structure performs functions typical of a body that should instead report to the head of the executive. This is what happens in other countries that use the services not only to gather information but also to carry out “active measures” and clandestine operations in foreign jurisdictions in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.
Possible reasons for the change in approach
It is reasonable to assume that, in the aftermath of the armistice that ended hostilities between Japan and the Allies, this choice was imposed on Tokyo to prevent the head of government from also having direct control over the intelligence apparatus.
Now, however, in the changed geopolitical scenario, with old alliances creaking and new agreements being forged outside the direct control of the US, it is necessary to equip oneself with partners capable of operating autonomously in the Indo-Pacific arena.
This would explain the decision to relax the constraints imposed on Japan by the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco and subsequent developments in relations with the US.
Empirical evidence of this shift in attitude towards Japan’s role dates back at least to 2020, when the English-speaking services —the Five Eyes— began to show a more concrete interest in collaborating with Tokyo in areas that, strictly speaking, had little to do with internal security, but which “connected” Japanese intelligence structures to the network for containing and countering traditional geopolitical interlocutors in the Indo-Pacific area.
The next steps
As mentioned, the decision to bring intelligence control back under the Prime Minister’s remit is entirely in line with what other Western governments already do. This allows the Japanese head of government to engage with partners on a fully equal footing, both in terms of military cooperation and in terms of information gathering and the adoption of active measures towards other countries such as China, whose military activism is perceived by Japan as a serious national security issue. Japan’s choice, therefore, is indicative of how the strategic axis in the Indo-Pacific area has already changed and suggests that its involvement, at every level, will be anything but marginal.
All this is happening, at least for now, without a formal amendment to the Constitution, but at the same time, it increasingly reveals the gap between the invocation of the rule of law as an insurmountable limit even for executives, and the pragmatic necessities of exercising power.
In other words, the announced reform of Japanese intelligence does not change the form of the Constitution, but redefines its use.
Tokyo is therefore preparing for an Indo-Pacific in which deterrence no longer depends solely on the ability to respond, but also requires action.
Japan is not returning to power: it is simply ceasing to pretend that it is not.